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After 'One Angry Woman'
Jeffrey Rosent

In 1996, I set out to test a widely accepted hypothesis about
race and juries: namely, that race-based jury nullification was on
the rise. In the wake of the O.J. Simpson trials, the question of
whether white and black jurors were capable of transracial
agreement had created something of a civic crisis. The stark contrast in the ways that white and black citizens evaluated Simpson's guilt seemed to challenge one of the basic premises of the
American jury: that citizens from different ethnic backgrounds
can deliberate and then converge on a common truth. And when
a mostly white civil jury found Simpson liable after a mostly
black criminal jury had acquitted him, the contrast threatened to
confirm what had become conventional wisdom. As New York
Times columnist Bob Herbert put it after the Simpson criminal
trial, "A society rent along racial lines, in an overheated atmosphere in which both sides lack confidence in the justice system, is
a society headed for catastrophe."'
In Washington, D.C., where I decided to focus my inquiry,
more than 70 percent of the jurors are African American, as are
more than 50 percent of the police officers and 95 percent of the
defendants.2 Many believe that the nation's capital has been
stricken by an epidemic of race-based jury nullification. In Race
and the CriminalJustice System: How Race Affects Jury Trial, a
collection of essays published by the Center for Equal Opportunity in Washington, D.C., several of the authors cited statistics
originally published in the Wall Street Journal indicating that
acquittal rates in the Bronx, in the District of Columbia, and in
the county surrounding Detroit are much higher than the purported "national acquittal rate of 17 percent."3 Moreover, in the
t Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School
Bob Herbert, Madness, Not Justice, NY Times A31 (Oct 6, 1995).
2 Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, New Yorker 55 (Feb 24 & March 3, 1997).
'
See Michael D. Weiss and Karl Zinsmeister, When Race Trumps Truth in the
Courtroom, in Race and the Criminal Justice System: How Race Affects Jury Trials 63
(Center for Equal Opportunity 1997). For an argument that the 17 percent figure is inflated, and that actual acquittal rate from the small group of jury trials sampled by the
Wall Street Journalis 21 percent, a number not noticeably different than the acquittal
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wake of my colleague Paul Butler's controversial Yale Law Journal article calling on black jurors to acquit guilty black defendants in non-violent drug crimes,4 District of Columbia judges
now give prospective jurors what attorneys call an "anti-Butler
instruction.'
After conducting a series of initial interviews with about a
dozen African American federal judges and prosecutors in
Washington, however, I was persuaded that the conventional
wisdom about race and juries is wrong. (This was one of those
rare instances where a working hypothesis had to be abandoned
in light of the evidence.) Prosecutors could supply few anecdotal
examples of classic nullification according to the Butler model:
that is, trials in which a mostly black jury acquitted a black defendant despite their belief in his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
because they didn't want to send another young black man to jail.
Instead, the prosecutors suggested that they had observed a rise
in hung juries, in which a lone hold out - often an African
American woman - refused to convict over the furious objections
of eleven black and white fellow jurors who were convinced of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Eric Holder, former United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia, who is now the Deputy Attorney General, estimated that during the five years that he
served as a judge on the D.C. Superior Court, he presided over at
least ten trials that ended in 11-1 or 10-2 hung juries, despite
overwhelming evidence of guilt.6 On the basis of these initial interviews, I then sought out former jurors, and in relatively short
order, I was able to reconstruct in some detail the deliberations in
four trials that ultimately deadlocked 11-1. The results were
published as One Angry Woman.7
In the four trials I discussed, I was struck by the following:
although African American judges and prosecutors spoke anecdotally about their impression that black District of Columbia juries
were increasingly hanging or nullifying because they were reluctant to send young black men to jail, I found no case in which the
rate in the Bronx, in the District of Columbia, and in Wayne County, Michigan, see Roger
Parloff, Race and Juries:If It Ain't Broke.... American Lawyer 72 (June 1997).
Paul Butler, Racially Based Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 Yale L J 677, 715 (1995).
5 See Nkechi Taifa, Jury Nullification:Problem or Panacea(unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
6 Interview with Eric Holder, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia.
[Editor's Note: Interviews discussed in this Article were verified by the New Yorker. The
Universityof Chicago LegalForum does not verify interviews.]
Rosen, New Yorker at 55-64 (cited in note 2).
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nullifying impulse expressed itself unambiguously. Instead, the
hanging jurors in the trials I described conformed to a model that
I called "unreasonable doubt" - that is, jurors were overcome by
religious scruples or conspiracy theories, or their mistrust of the
police, and as a result they expressed irrational doubts that
struck their fellow jurors as unreasonable.
It might be argued, of course, that when hanging jurors vote
to acquit because of their distrust of the police, they are, in fact,
engaging in nullification. But nullification, according to the
Butler model requires a self-conscious decision to free an African
American defendant whom the jury believes is guilty as a form of
racial payback. By contrast, the hanging jurors I encountered
continued to express doubt about the defendant's guilt, rather
than about the justness of the laws in question. Moreoever, the
Federal Public Defender's Office in Washington, D.C. reports that
black jurors vote to acquit roughly the same percentage of Hispanic and white defendants as black ones.'
What I would like to do in this Article is to review and categorize the hanging jurors in several of the trials I discussed in
One Angry Woman and in others that I did not. Let me begin by
apologizing for and defending the anecdotal quality of my presentation. Journalism should never be confused with scholarship;
but the lack of reliable empirical data on the subject and the elusiveness of the phenomenon being described force me to rely on
anecdotes.9 As I will argue in Part I, the anecdotal evidence suggests that nullification is a phenomenon that rarely speaks its
name: hanging jurors almost always defend their position in
terms of reasonable doubts. In Part II, I will examine and respond to criticisms of the One Angry Woman thesis, focusing on
statistical arguments that neither hung juries nor race-based acquittals are, in fact, on the rise. Finally, I will conclude by reexamining proposals for jury reform - in particular allowing
nonunanimous verdicts and eliminating peremptory challenges
- in light of the anecdotal evidence I surveyed.

8

Jeffrey Rosen, Jurymandering:A Case Against Peremptory Challenges, New Re-

public 15 (Nov 30, 1992).
' All quotations and references to jurors and prosecutors in these articles are taken
from background interviews conducted as research for One Angry Woman and are on file
with the author. Unless named, none of the interview subjects consented to identification;
to protect their identities, case citations are omitted.
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I. UNREACHABLE JURORS AND UNREASONABLE DOUBTS

I will begin with the anecdotes. Eric Holder has identified
three categories of what he called "unreachable" jurors: those
overcome by religious scruples, by mistrust of the police, or by
irrational conspiracy theories." I will discuss each in turn.
A. Religious Scruples
In two of the trials I described, jurors were overcome at the
last minute by their religious scruples. In the first trial, the suspect fired at members of a rival gang as an off-duty policeman
observed him." After the police officer saw the suspect get into a
parked car, he approached and found a gun under the front seat.
A trial followed several months later; it was so straightforward
that it lasted only an afternoon. The prosecutor, a young white
woman, examined the African American police officer who had
made the arrest. The defense attorney, who was from Nigeria,
argued a case of mistaken identity. The jury looked like America,
or at least like the District of Columbia. There were five black
men, ranging from an oncologist to a native of Jamaica who
cleaned hospitals. There were three white men, including a gay
Jewish social service worker - who was quickly elected foreman
and a liberal lawyer for the Environmental Protection Agency.
There were three white women, including a journalist and a publisher. And there was one black woman, in her early twenties,
who was studying to be a law librarian.
The initial vote, taken anonymously, was eight for conviction,
two undecided, and two for acquittal. It quickly emerged that the
Jamaican hospital worker and the aspiring law librarian had
voted to acquit. The Jamaican man confessed that he lived in the
neighborhood where the shooting had taken place. 'm raising
kids and I hear gun shots every night," he said. "If I had the
money to get out I would, but I can't put this guy away." One of
the retired black men challenged him strongly. "That kid shot off
a pistol," he said. "There's no doubt he did it. The gun was under
the seat; his story doesn't make any sense; there are eyewitnesses. What more do you want? rIm sick of this going on in my

city."
The aspiring law librarian expressed more serious doubts.
Her cousin had been killed by a police officer, she said, and she
, Interview with Eric Holder (cited in note 6).
, See note 9.
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couldn't trust the police. At this point, the black oncologist became incensed. "If the cop who arrested this kid was white," he
said, "I might agree with you, but we're talking nigger to nigger
here. There's no doubt about what happened." At the end of the
day, a Friday, the jurors took another vote. It was eleven to one.
The librarian then confessed she was the holdout. "I just don't
know," she said repeatedly.
On Monday morning, the holdout juror said she needed to
speak. "It was my birthday this weekend. My husband bought a
cake and invited friends, but I sent them home and went to
church on Sunday. I said, 'Why, God? Why me? Why can't I find
him guilty?' God told me, 'I have forgiven him.'" Her voice was
shaking with emotion as she confessed that she could never vote
to convict. At this point, the young African American security
guard turned to her. "Sister," he said, "the judge asked you before you sat on the jury if you couldn't pass judgment on someone
to stand up. You didn't stand up. Why?" The holdout murmured
her apologies, but she had nothing to say. The jury filed out in
anger.
In another case, three African American men were robbed at
knifepoint in Malcolm X Park, not far from the trendy restaurants of Adams Morgan. 2 All three immediately identified the
defendant, a twenty-three-year-old African American named Tyrone Gordon. The holdout juror in the Gordon trial seemed to be
concerned about the plight of young black men. "We're losing so
many of our young brothers these days," the African American
man who had changed his vote lamented to the grandmotherly
holdout. "I know it, I know it," she agreed.
But religious scruples were what she invoked publicly to justify her decision. When deliberations started again, the white
woman confronted the holdout directly. "I recognize there are too
many African American young men in prison," she said, "and that
bothers me. But I look at these victims, who are also African
American men, and they did everything right. We need to support them." Some of the other African American jurors murmured their agreement, but the holdout remained unmoved.
"This defendant is no brother of mine," she said. "I don't trust
anybody. The only person I trust is myself and the Lord above."
Pressed to explain herself, the holdout confessed, i have a hard
time sitting in judgment of someone else. I have to sleep and look
at myself in the mirror at night."
12

Id.
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Interviewed after the Gordon trial, the presiding judge, Eric
T. Washington, said that he asks all prospective jurors during
voir dire whether they have religious or moral objections to conviction. Those who confess that they do are dismissed for cause.
Why does he think the holdout juror didn't confess her religious
objections in advance? "Ive seen the emotion in people's eyes,
when they've voted unanimously to convict somebody," said
Judge Washington, "and perhaps in the cold, pre-trial environment of questions and answers, they're not aware of how they
might feel about the matter of punishment." 3
B. Mistrust of the Police
In several of the trials I described, the holdout jurors' mistrust of the police led to doubts that the rest of the jury considered unreasonable. One case involved a defendant who was carrying a gun, and who dropped a plastic bag full of crack as soon
as he was approached by two police officers in an open-air drug
market. 4 The holdout juror, whom I referred to by the pseudonym Michelle Thompson, was a graduate of Mount Holyoke and
Yale Law School, born about forty years ago to a stable, twoparent working class black family in southeast Washington, D.C.
"I have to admit, my personal experience growing up in
Washington has put me in a situation where I don't trust the police," she said. "Ive seen them lie." She recalls that when she
was a teenager growing up in Washington, "you didn't ride in
your mama's car with a bunch of black teenagers, because you
knew you were going to be stopped." Since graduating from Yale
Law School, she says, when she has driven with another attorney
or doctor who is also African American, "the cops have stopped us
and really humiliated the guy."
Thompson says that although she feels unfairly treated by
the police because of her race, she mistrusts black officers as well
as white ones. "Both of these officers were black, but I didn't believe them." Because the two police officers disagreed about
whether the defendant had thrown the drugs or dropped them,
Thompson says, "I didn't believe either of them saw anything."
The other jurors, however, were unsympathetic to Thompson's
claim that because some policemen lie, these policemen could not
be trusted. She recalled that several black jurors called the de'3

Interview with Judge Eric T. Washington, Superior Court for the District of Co-

lumbia.
,4 See note 9.
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fendant, who was on probation for stealing, a "low-life scum." "I
grew up with people who were bad guys," Thompson retorted,
"but they were still somebody's brother, and son. I saw them as
human beings, not as low-lifes."
At this point, class tensions bubbled to the surface. An older
black woman said: "You're just one of those highfalutin liberals.
We have to live with this crime, while you probably live in the
suburbs. I hope he turns up at the door and terrorizes you, and
robs you." Another woman said: "m on the front line, and you're
off having a cute life, with your degrees and your money."
Thompson was shaken: "I didn't know what to say." At the end of
the second day, Thompson told her fellow jurors:
I cannot, in good conscience, do this. I really can't. If I do
this simply to go along with you guys, and to get you to
stop saying stuff like 'I hope he robs you next,' I will simply be capitulating to improve my personal situation, not
because I think he's guilty.
After she forced a mistrial, Thompson said,
I went home for two nights and cried and cried and cried.
I still don't know if I did the right thing. He could have
been guilty. You know what I mean? I felt the same way I
felt at the end of the Simpson prosecution, where I think
they left the jury very little reason to do anything but not
convict.
Thompson felt even worse when one of her friends, a black
prosecutor who now works for Eric Holder, told her that the police know who the local drug dealers are, and that the reason
they hadn't dusted the drugs for fingerprints - one of her central
concerns - was that plastic bags don't hold fingerprints very
well. But reliving the experience several years later, Thompson
was not contrite.
What he was really telling me is that you need to trust
whatever the police say, and I don't. I have seen the police
lie up close and personal about things I was involved in
my whole life. And it has not stopped. It still happens,
even since rve become an attorney and have this middleclass facade.
In several cases, jurors' mistrust of the police led them to
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construct elaborate conspiracy theories. One holdout juror suggested that the police had not dusted a gun for fingerprints because they had planted it, prompting Eric Holder to remark:
"We've got to the point now where the police dust guns in situations where it doesn't make sense to dust, because one juror out
of twelve will say, 'Well, maybe it wasn't his gun."15 The holdout
juror in the trial of Tyrone Gordon made clear that she thought
the police had framed the defendant.16 "How could they lose the
knife if there really was a knife?" she asked. She was skeptical of
a blurry photograph of the knife, taken at the scene of the crime,
that had been introduced as evidence. "I think this picture is bogus," she said. "My mind is made up and it's not going to
change."
I found no examples of cases where jurors said openly that
their mistrust of the police led them to nullify laws because they
refused to send another young black man to jail on principle. Instead, jurors said that their mistrust of the police led them to
have reasonable doubts, even doubts that their fellow jurors considered unreasonable. Nevertheless, the specter of payback hung
over several of the trials I described. "It's not like the way it used
to be in this city," one African American holdout juror told
Bernadette Sergeant, a black prosecutor. "In the old days, a man
could walk the street and not be afraid of being held by the police
for an 11"17
Rather than glorifying jurors who express mistrust for the
police, Eric Holder suggests that "as painful as it is to say," some
"unreachable" jurors, like some "seventeen year old black crimi5 "There are some folks who have been so
nals, are beyond help.""
seared by racism, who are so affected by what has happened to
them because they are black, that even if you're the most credible, up-front, black man or woman in law enforcement, you're
never going to be able to reach them," says Holder. "There are
other people who are simply misinformed and perhaps intellectually lazy, or intellectually dishonest, and you're never going to
reach them either. These are the people who get into the jury
rooms and then simply don't deliberate, or simply say, 'All cops
lie."
Like the search for legislative intent in cases where legisla5 Interview with Eric Holder (cited in note 6).
See note 9.
1, Interview with Bernadette Sergeant, Assistant United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia.
" Interview with Eric Holder (cited in note 6).
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tive motives are mixed, it is hard to know what really motivates
the jurors whose mistrust of the police leads them to claim that
they have reasonable doubts about guilt. Perhaps their real goal
is to keep young black men out of jail, and they are trying to conceal or justify their nullifying impulses by claiming that they are
guided by more legally acceptable reasonable doubts. In the
Simpson criminal trial, after all, the jurors claimed to be guided
by reasonable doubts, despite extensive circumstantial evidence
that the verdict was really an expression of nullification. 9 All of
this anecdotal evidence suggests to me that nullification remains
controversial enough that jurors rarely acknowledge their nullifying urges as such. Instead, they justify their position by invoking the language of reasonable doubt, even when their doubts
are, to other jurors, unreasonable.
C. Eccentric, Disengaged, and Undeliberative Jurors
In We, the Jury, Professor Jeffrey Abramson suggests that
nonunanimous juries might damage the quality of jury deliberations, because mock jury studies have found that jurors in the
majority are less likely to try to persuade dissenters when verdicts can be nonunanimous. ° Nevertheless, the unreachable jurors I described are surprisingly disinclined to deliberate in the
first place. One initial holdout clipped discount coupons instead
of deliberating with her peers. "I don't want to be here. This is a
waste of my time. rve got other things to do," she said.2 On the
second day of trial, however, she changed her vote, more as a result of indifference and peer pressure than of having grappled
with the evidence. Another initial holdout was known to other
jurors as the "rock star," because instead of deliberating, she
would put on earphones and listen to her Walkman. She, too,
changed her vote after being convinced that two verdicts could be
announced separately so she would not have to face the families
of both defendants at the same time.22 While I do not doubt that
nonunanimous verdicts reduce the incentives to deliberate, the
profiles of undeliberative jurors should make us resist the temptation to paint hanging jurors as epigones of Henry Fonda in the
Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and The Crits,New Republic 27 (Dec 9, 1996).
Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 199200 (Basic 1994) (citing Charlan Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of
Majority vs. Unanimity Decision Rules in Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Saul M. Kassen, and
Cynthia E. Willis, eds, In the Jury Box: ControversiesIn the Courtroom 250 (Sage 1987).
21 See note 9.
Interview with Eric Holder (cited in note 6).
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Twelve Angry Men model, trying to sway their skeptical fellow
jurors through reasoned persuasion.
Two trials that I left out of One Angry Woman are worth considering here. In one of the trials, the hanging juror was a white
woman, and in the other, an African American man. Both trials
were omitted, frankly, for aesthetic reasons, to preserve the conceit of the piece. But the omitted examples remind us that unreachable jurors are not always African American women; indeed,
the predominance of African American women among the pool of
hanging jurors in Washington may reflect nothing more than the
demographics of the jury pool itself.
One prosecutor told me about a second-degree murder case
that hung 11-1. The hanging juror was an elderly white woman
whose father was a police officer; she had recently fallen victim to
a crime. The black prosecutor expected she would be a perfect
juror, but the woman wanted a motive in a case where there
really was no motive, despite the furious objections of black and
white jurors who wanted to convict. The prosecutor attributed
the juror's doubt to "a combination of watching TV and expecting
airtight evidence. Maybe it was just a quirk with her," he said.
Another case involved a youth who beat up a woman and
took her purse.' The jury consisted of one white man, a journalist, and eleven African Americans, including working-class people, retired federal workers, professionals, and a woman who
worked at the White House. The police for the Washington
Metro, on the lookout for a robber who stalked women late at
night and took their purses, had staked out the Metro Center
subway stop downtown. They were in a van with tinted windows
and saw a woman being dropped off by a driver. A young black
man followed her into the station, and the police actually saw
him rubbing his hands together in anticipation of the assault.
According to the testimony of two Howard University students,
twenty seconds after the young man got onto the down escalator,
he passed the heavy-set white woman whom he was following.
The students turned the corner and then heard screaming.
Turning around, they ran to the foot of the escalator and saw the
suspect fighting with the woman, grabbing her purse, punching
her with his fist, slamming her head against the floor, and then
running up the stairs. The victim corroborated the testimony of
the two women, although they had never seen each other before.
The metro police intercepted the suspect at the top of the stairs
' See note 9.
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with the purse. He was spread-eagled when the two witnesses
and the victim arrived, and all three immediately identified him
as the attacker. Later, the Metro police interrogated the suspect
and he signed a confession, saying he needed the money.
The trial lasted three days. The initial vote was 10-2 for conviction, and very quickly after that 11-1. As one juror told me,
The holdout was a retired African American man, who
throughout the trial read a book called Masonry and Its
Symbols. It emerged within minutes that he was not going to be persuaded. His reasons for being against conviction were varied and really imaginative. He objected to
the confession, in which the suspect had said "I saw her
exit the vehicle." "No black young man uses words like
vehicle," he said, "those were words that were put in his
mouth by the cops, we don't know what went on in that
room to get him to sign that. The cop lied when he said
that those were the young man's words, so therefore, everything he said is a lie." The holdout said that the Howard students were arrogant and snippy and unreliable.
There was a very slight discrepancy between the written
reports and the testimony of the two metro cops, about the
hours they had been observing the kid, and the holdout
said: "They're lying. rm going to throw out everything the
police said."
These statements emerged over three or four days; he didn't
state them as a soliloquy.
The reaction of all eleven of us was great dismay. The
other eleven had been absolutely convinced of this kid's
guilt and were shocked at his evasions and partisanship,
[so we] just argued with him vehemently. A couple of
times, a couple of the other jurors, not me, said to him,
'look man, we know what you're doing here, you're just not
going to convict a black man, are you? You wouldn't convict him no matter what they said, regardless of the evidence.' 'Don't you be bringing in irrelevant stuff like that,'
he said, denying the accusations. He was a very smart
guy, and I think that he recalled that when he was a youth
somewhere down South he had been stopped by police for
something he hadn't done. At various moments, each of
the ten others lost their temper with him because they
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found him impossible. Ultimately, the judge declared a
mistrial, and the prosecutor asked the holdout why he had
refused to convict. The holdout stayed to talk and he offered a rambling plea for justice. 'Your honor, we just
need to have justice in the courthouse,' he said. I think he
was scrambling for justification but couldn't say it in the
judge's presence, he couldn't come up with the words.
II. OBJECTIONS
Let me now consider objections to the One Angry Woman
thesis. The most powerful, it seems to me, comes from critics who
have expressed skepticism that race-based jury nullification
really is on the rise. A recent article in Judicature argues that
"[c]ontrary to the assumption of jury critics, the data show that
conviction rates in federal jury trials have increased, both across
And Roger Parloff of The Amerithe board and in drug cases.
can Lawyer suggested that my sample of hung juries was too
small to be reliable.'
What, on reflection, do the data suggest? In addition to the
anecdotal impressions of prosecutors and trial judges in the District of Columbia, I noted in One Angry Woman that in 1966,
when Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel published their classic
study The American Jury, they estimated that about 5.5 percent
of all criminal jury trials resulted in hung juries.26 In contrast, I
wrote, between 1992 and 1994, the average hung jury rate in the
nine most diverse California counties, including Los Angeles, was
13 percent.2 In Washington, D.C., based on numbers suplied by
the United States Attorney's Office, I reported that an average of
13 percent of all federal criminal trials ended in hung juries compared with only five percent in 1991.'
The D.C. statistics are based on a small sample of trials, and
in the interest of full disclosure, I should take this opportunity to
reveal the numbers more fully:29

'

Neil Vidmar, Sara Sun Beale, Mary Rose and Laura F. Donnely, Should We Rush

to Reform the CriminalJury? 80 Judicature 286, 287 (May-June 1997).

Roger Parloff, American Lawyer at 73-74 (cited in note 3).
Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 56-57 (Chicago 1971).

Rosen, New Yorker at 55 (cited in note 2).
Id.

At my request, the office of Eric Holder generated this data.
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1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
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Number
of Trials
345
235
159
127
132
88

Hung
Juries
17
34
16
23
10
13

Percent
4.9%
14.5%
10%
18%
8%
14.8%

Given the small numbers of trials involved, and the relatively large fluctuation from year to year, it may seem questionable to average the years from 1992 to 1996, and to compare them
with 1991. Furthermore, because misdemeanors are no longer
eligible for jury trials, the total number of jury trials in the District of Columbia Superior Court has declined dramatically in
recent years.30 This casts doubt on the validity of comparing jury
results in the years before and after the change. Roger Parloff
takes issue with my use of statistics along these lines. First, he
notes that the overall number of 11-1 hung juries is exceedingly
small.3 ' He cites a study by the Los Angeles County public defender. The study analyzes hung juries that occurred in Los Angeles County between July 1994 and March 1997, where about
one-third of California's criminal jury trials are tried each year.
Parloff notes that the study found that only about 1.6 percent of
all felony jury trials and only 0.075 percent of all felony dispositions actually hang 11-1 for conviction. "If there are 10,000 jury
trials a year in California," Parloff writes,
that means there might be 160 jury trials (including misdemeanor trials) that are hung 11 to 1 for conviction
statewide each year. Only 34 percent of those cases are
actually retried, according to the public defender's study,
meaning about 54 retrials (0.34 x 160). Among those 11to-1 hung-jury cases that are retried, juries convict only 58
percent of the time, hanging again or acquitting in 42 percent of the cases - i.e., in our hypothetical example, in 23
of the 54 retrials. (Of the 77 actual Los Angeles cases that
were hung 11-1 in favor of guilt between July 1, 1994, and
April 3, 1997, 26 were retried, resulting in 15 guilty verSam Skolnik, The Jury is Out, Legal Times 1 (Nov 3, 1997).
Parloff, American Lawyer at 73-74 (cited in note 3).
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dicts [58 percent], five acquittals [19 percent], and six
hung juries [23 percent]).32

Parloff goes on to argue that hung jury rates between 12 and
15 percent have been common at least for the past decade.
"[T]here is no evidence," he writes,
that hung-jury rates in Los Angeles have risen one iota in
more than a decade. According to Los Angeles superior
court figures, hung-jury rates in 1985 were 15 percent,
and have stayed fairly steady ever since, ranging from a
high of 16.1 percent in 1987 to lows of 12 percent in 1991,
1993, and 1994."
Finally, Parloff notes that Kalven and Zeisel were never confident about their 5.5 percent estimate, which they based on information provided by state court judges around the country.
Parloff points to Kalven and Zeisers appendix, which notes that
only four jurisdictions kept any data at all on hung juries. One of
the jurisdictions, serendipitously, was Los Angeles, which reported to Kalven and Zeisel in 1956 that for every 100 criminal
jury trials that reached a unanimous verdict in Los Angeles, another 15 ended in hung juries - a rate of roughly 13 percent.'
Parloff calls these statistics5 "completely consistent with the num3
bers being recorded today."

How can the anecdotal impression of prosecutors and judges
that 11-1 hung juries are on the rise be reconciled with the statistics which, viewed skeptically, may not suggest dramatic changes
in hung jury rates, at least in the past decade? One possibility is
that 11-1 hung jury rates are, indeed, on the rise, especially in
cases involving African American defendants in urban jurisdictions, but that they have been counterbalanced by a rise in convictions for other types of crimes. Another possibility is that
hung jury rates have not changed dramatically, but that the profile of the typical hanging juror in Washington - namely, an African American woman expressing doubts that seem to prosecutors, judges, and fellow jurors to be unreasonable - has changed
since discriminatory barriers to jury service by women and minorities were eliminated.
Id.

Id at 72.
Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at 56 (cited in note 29).
Parloff, American Lawyer at 72 (cited in note 3).
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It would be irresponsible, in short, to make any bold pronouncements about the increase in hung juries since the 1950s.
But given the empirical gaps in our knowledge, a research project
collecting more reliable data is clearly needed. To that end, I was
heartened to learn after the New Yorker article was published
that Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the State Court of Appeals of
New York has called for better data on precisely these points.

HI. REFORMS
A. Nonunanimous Verdicts
At the end of One Angry Woman, I tentatively endorsed
nonunanimous verdicts as a reform precisely tailored to cure the
ills that stemmed from the "unreasonable doubt" phenomenon. If
most jurors are able to deliberate rationally, if the holdouts refuse to deliberate, and if nullification is widespread in 11-1 or 10-2
votes, then, I suggested, "[t]he elimination of the unanimity requirement... might be seen as the fulfillment of our new ideal of
the multicultural jury: deliberative and representative at the
same time." 6
In We, the Jury, Professor Jeffrey Abramson expresses skepticism on this score. He writes that "nonunanimous juries damage the quality of deliberations and the legitimacy that jury verdicts command in the eye of the public." Parloff expresses concerns along the same lines:
Studies using mock juries have found - obviously - that
jurors in the majority have less incentive to persuade dissenters when verdicts can be nonunanimous.
Consequently, when a nonunanimous verdict will suffice, jurors'
conflicting memories of evidence may not be ironed out,
and their differing interpretations of evidence may not be
debated. The deliberations are swifter, but less civil and
more superficial."
My interviews do not support this idealized vision of jury debates. I found little deliberation ocurring: the initial votes were
10-2 or at most 9-3, and positions hardened very quickly at 11-1.
Holdout jurors refused to deliberate; instead, they merely dug in
Rosen, New Yorker at 64 (cited in note 2).
Abramson, We, the Jury at 200 (cited in note 20).
Parloff, American Lawyer at 74 (cited in note 3).

194

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:

their heels. If these descriptions are accurate, they suggest that
nonunanimous juries, pace Professor Abramson, might not substantially reduce deliberation.
On the other hand, if the numbers are as small as Parloff
suggests, if 11-1 hung juries are not a national epidemic, and if
42 percent of the 11-1 hung juries that are tried result in another
hung jury or an acquittal, then the reform may not be worth the
candle.
B. Eliminating Peremptory Challenges
The usual objection to eliminating peremptory challenges is
that random jury selection would make it impossible to screen out
irrational jurors. If Eric Holder's anatomy of the "unreachable"
juror is correct, however, peremptory challenges are likely to be
ineffective in screening out nondeliberative jurors who come from
all races and classes, many of whom lie to get on juries. Since the
numbers of unreachable jurors appear to be low - one or two in
each petit jury - then the elimination of peremptories, combined
with nonunanimous verdicts, would be an effective way of ensuring that non-deliberative jurors were outvoted.
One might, of course, go to the other extreme, expanding the
use of peremptory challenges, and resurrecting the nineteenth
century vision of jury service as a political right that can be denied on religious, if not racial, grounds.39 But permitting prospective jurors to be struck on the basis of their religious beliefs
would surely be an over-inclusive way of screening out unreachable jurors, because only a small minority of religious jurors refuse to deliberate. To the extent that unreachable jurors come
from all classes and educational backgrounds, strikes on these
grounds are likely to be ineffective as well.
C. Do Nothing
Perhaps the hung jury crisis, like the nullification crisis, is
nothing more than journalistic exaggeration. If so, as Vidmar
and his colleagues suggest in their Judicaturearticle, the best
alternative is to stay the course. Given the extensive anecdotal
An early draft of the Fifteenth Amendment would have prohibited discrimination
in voting rights on religious as well as racial grounds, but it was abandoned because of
lack of support. See William Gillette, The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passageof the
Fifteenth Amendment (Johns Hopkins 1965). If jury service, like voting, is viewed as a
core political right, then the right to vote on juries, according to the original understanding of the Fifteenth Amendment, presumably could be denied on religious grounds.
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evidence that a problem does indeed exist, at least in certain jurisdictions, I'm looking forward to more systematic empirical surveys of precisely how widespread the unreasonable doubt phenomenon is. But more than a year after the publication of One
Angry Woman, I am increasingly agnostic about whether or not
the cure might be worse than the disease.

